Continue reading »]]> Part 3 of a discussion and critique of John R. Shook’s The God Debates

Ian Kluge

Let us look at one more example of Shook’s straw-man methodology. He says, “The basic ‘fine-tuning’ argument for god has this form:

1. If god exists, then it is highly probable that this universe would permit life;
2. The universe is organized to permit life;
3. In the naturalistic “multiverse” theory it is not highly probable that the universe would permit life;
4. It is more reasonable to accept the theory that makes it more probable that this universe exists;

Conclusion: God exists.(8)

First of all, what reputable theist — philosopher or theologian — has ever argued for this hodge-podge? Can Shook document anyone but a philosophical naïf presenting this argument?

Once again, we are back to the main problem in The God Debates — Shook is  making up straw-man parodies of theist arguments in order to refute them. This example shows how far he is willing to go. All sorts of different arguments are mixed up: the existence of God, the existence of life, a gratuitous premise about multiverses as well as a debatable premise on what is or is not reasonable to believe. These are so sloppily put together that they do not form any kind of argument at all, and it is disingenuous to lead readers to think that intelligent theists argue like this or that this is the best theism can do.

The fine-tuning argument for God’s existence — which is a probabilistic proof — might go as follows:

1. Our universe is extremely fine-tuned in regards to a large number of fundamental physical constants without which none of the cosmic structure and life we know would be possible;
2. These constants all lie within an exceedingly narrow range;
3. Even a change in one or a small number of constants makes the current universe impossible;
4. The odds of such an inter-related web of fine-tuning or the conditions for such fine-tuning arising by chance are so low as to be almost zero.

Conclusion: The more unlikely a natural cause for this fine-tuning, the more likely it is that a non-natural or super-natural cause, i.e. God, exists.

This probabilistic proof is, of course, not an absolute proof, but it has the advantage of being linked to the current research. Moreover, it makes the decision to believe in God a rational, evidence-based decision and works with calculable probabilities.

It might be objected that if the universe has enough time — infinity supposedly — then this rare combination of fine-tuned factors will inevitably arise. This is arguing like my neighbor that his wife’s chances of producing a boy improved with each pregnancy. (They wound up with six girls.) Odds close to zero remain close to zero no matter how many times the universe or universes re-configure. We could, of course, discuss variations on this scenario, but that would take us too far from exposing Shook’s straw-man parodies.

Let us sample one more problematic argument from The God Debates.

According to Shook, “Recent cognitive psychology and brain experiments have been able to duplicate many of the characteristics of religious mystical experiences.”(9) To his credit, he admits that these experiments cannot eliminate the possibility of God. But then he proceeds to argue that because science can induce a brain experience of “an X that doesn’t probably exist anyway”(10) then “You have never really had an interaction with an X.”(11)

X, for those who haven’t guessed by now, is God.

He thinks this argument is “logically effective against gods”(12) — but this is a sad mistake. Why should not a lab-induced experience of X be just as valid as a natural one? The fact that X is given as a brain-experience is no surprise — how else do the scientists expect a vision to appear to a human brain? And how does the lab experience prove that X is not real?

One is reminded of an incident in Shaw’s St Joan, in which the Inquisitor asks Joan if St Catherine appears in her head and Joan replies, that of course she does — where else could St Catherine appear? Appearing there was no proof that Joan never saw St. Catherine or that St Catherine was unreal. The same applies to X. The only way that Shook can even make his semi-syllogism appear plausible is to make it circular, i.e. to introduce the “an X that probably doesn’t exist anyway”(13) in the first premise and then use that to conclude “You never really had an interaction with X.”(14)

To conclude: The God Debates is a disappointing book — disappointing because it promises so much and delivers so little of real substance to the aware reader. The civil tone is a welcome and major step forward in “the God debates” but it is not enough to make up for the serious mistrust aroused by the numerous fallacious arguments such as we have sampled.

Shook seems intent on strengthening the case for secular humanism by straw-man parodies of theistic arguments — which is surely a losing strategy and does nothing to advance our understanding of this important subject.

============= References ==================

8 The God Debates, p. 142.

9 The God Debates, p. 103.

10 The God Debates, p. 104.

11 The God Debates, p. 105.

12 The God Debates, p. 105.

13 The God Debates, p. 104.

14 The God Debates, p. 105.

Continue reading »]]> Part 2 of a discussion and critique of John R. Shook’s The God Debates

Ian Kluge

Behind the logical plausibility of God lies another argument Shook dismisses in The God Debates, namely, the “Theology beyond the World”(3) which argues that “god is the necessary condition for the universe, for its order, and for its intelligibility.”(4) He recognizes that this assertion appeals to the principle of sufficient reason which he takes seriously — except, of course, in this case. He calls this “the argument from pseudo-cosmology.”(5) (“Pseudo” is a word Shook uses frequently for viewpoints he objects to.)

Here is how he sets up the argument.

1. Everything that exists requires an explanation for its existence [a rough statement of the principle of sufficient reason, PSR]
2. Nature (a collective label for all natural things) exists, so an explanation is required.
3. Nothing natural can serve as an explanation for nature, since a proposed natural thing would just count as more nature.
4. Only something supernatural could serve as an explanation for nature.
5. It is more reasonable to accept a proposed explanation than to leave something unexplained.

Conclusion. Something supernatural exists to explain nature.(6)

Shook accepts premise #1, the PSR, and then extrapolates that since natural things require a sufficient cause, so must super-natural things. This is a logical category mistake, i.e. treating one kind of thing as if it were another kind of thing. We don’t confuse telephones and the meaning of the conversations held on them. The “child’s question, ‘Who made God’”(7) is a child’s question precisely because it is an elementary category mistake.

The whole point of religion is that God, the Absolute, the Ground of Being — whatever — is not subject to natural limitations such as time, space, and mass simply because He/It is the pre-condition for time, space, and mass etc to exist. That is why He belongs to a different category than ordinary contingent beings. Children usually don’t get this — but adults should.

Shook’s conclusion shows him skating around the logical force of premise #3. Premise #3 claims that even in principle, nature, matter, the physical world does not explain itself. Any attempt to explain the existence of nature by means of nature ends with an infinite regress — a sign that our reasoning is off. In other words, any attempt to explain nature in strictly natural terms fails to satisfy the PSR.

If we try to identify a natural event that caused it all, we need simply ask what natural event caused that and so on ad infinitum. Since it is a natural event and not a ‘super-natural’ event, it requires a natural cause. Obviously, there cannot be an infinite line of events any more than there can be an infinite line of particular things. Every causal act and every individual entity can always be counted. No matter how many, they have a definite number — which infinity does not. You cannot have an indefinite, i.e. infinite number of things or events. If there are individual events and/or things, we need a starting point or as Aristotle put it, a first mover, i.e. God (which does not, of course, necessarily mean a “personal” God.) This is one among the many reasons why nature cannot explain nature.

Second, how could a cause (A) ever work its way through (a supposed) infinity of individual causes to have a particular effect at a future moment? It cannot get to the future — and, therefore, cannot be a cause. The distance between it and that future moment is infinite. We hasten to add that this is not a misuse of Zeno’s paradox because the space through which Zeno’s arrow travels is not made of real individual points. They are only imagined. However, the causal events in a supposedly infinite causal sequence are indeed made up of individual events which must be traversed one at a time. Thus, we know there can be no infinite line of causal events leading to the Big Bang.

However, if such a line is impossible, then there must be a limit, i.e. a first cause – or “God”, if you prefer, to initiate the sequence.

The strictly naturalist explanation of the existence of nature fails the PSR, which states that every thing-event requires an explanation for its existence and why it exists the way it does and not in some other way. There are reasons why running shoes exist and why they are the way they are. As we have seen, Shook’s naturalist explanation does not explain the existence of nature, let alone why nature is the way it is. No matter how much mathematics we bring to bear to our explanations, sooner or later we will bring up the PSR to the singularity, the branes, the quantum vacuum (which turns out to be not so empty) and so on.

The bottom line is that, in principle, no physical explanation for the existence of the universe can ultimately satisfy the PSR. It’s time for science to stop playing Don Quixote with the cosmic windmills.

The upshot of all this is that if nature cannot explain the origin of nature, then the possibility of some kind of non-natural origin of nature must be considered. It is not a matter of shoe-horning in a silly premise like #5 and its conclusion as Shook does in his parody of a theist argument, but rather a matter of recognizing that if nature cannot explain nature, we have no choice but to look at non-natural (i.e. super-natural) alternatives. This does not prove that a personal God exists but it does make it rationally necessary to consider super-natural origins of nature.

Next time: Fine-tuning God

============= References ==============

3 John R Shook, The God Debates, p. 153.

4 John R Shook, The God Debates, p. 153.

5 John R Shook, The God Debates, p. 153.

6 John R Shook, The God Debates, p. 134.

7 John R Shook, The God Debates, p. 134.

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Ian Kluge

Let’s start with the good news: The God Debates maintains a civil tone amid the often shrill abuse of the real-world God debates. Nothing like the late Christopher Hitchen’s somewhat hysterical contention that teaching children religion is equivalent to child-abuse;  no suggestion of Harris’s ominously totalitarian claim that even tolerating religious belief and freedom is intolerable; none of Dawkins’ withering scorn for philosophical texts and arguments he obviously hasn’t read and just as obviously doesn’t understand; and no sign of Dennett’s insulting references to atheists as “brights” (which, by implication, relegates Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Whitehead and Goedel — among others —  to the “dims”).

With The God Debates, a new tone emerges, and for this we are grateful. This book sets a better example for atheist-believer discussions — civil and courteous. Yet, for the most part, tone is often as far as it goes, for welcome as it is, Shook’s civil tone does not improve the quality of his arguments. Though he tries to embed his contentions in a typology of religious and secular beliefs and, thereby, tries to give them an aura of scientific objectivity and rigor, all too often he gives straw-man representations of religious and philosophical viewpoints opposed to his.

To be more precise, he generally presents religious and theist philosophical arguments in their weakest and even silliest forms and then puts on a show of refuting them. This is good strategy for scoring easy — and cheap — points in a high school debate, but it is a poor way to discover truth. To actually find truth, it is necessary to analyze the strongest arguments from both sides.

If Shook has found these straw-man arguments somewhere, he should reference them to demonstrate that reasonable philosophers and/or theologians have actually advanced the theist arguments as he presents them. I doubt he will be able to do that. In my opinion, he has made up his semi-syllogisms as examples of how he believes certain theist arguments run. If his belief is sincere, then obviously he does not understand many of these arguments. If his belief is insincere, then he is presenting straw-man parodies and —  to that extent — is deceiving his readers.

Here is an example of Shook’s method at work, found in premises #7 and #8 in his list of same:

• We couldn’t enjoy experiencing the world without consciousness.
• God would want us to experience the world.

Conclusion: God must exist to have endowed our brains with consciousness.(1)

Shook’s tactics are pretty obvious. First, he de-contextualizes the theist argument, stripping it of vital background information; then, he introduces premises irrelevant to proving that God must exist as the origin of consciousness; finally, he leads to a non-sequitur conclusion. The above premises are irrelevant because they are about the alleged wishes of God, and the alleged necessity of consciousness for enjoyment. Interesting topics, to be sure, but there is no logically necessary connection to God’s existence — even as the origin of consciousness.

As presented by Shook, the theist argument is silly. The problem is, that’s not how the theist argument actually works.

The context is the difficulties of explaining consciousness in strictly physical terms — a debate very much alive in our day.(2) The notion that mind-consciousness is identical to brain is far from settled. Moreover, as as Wittgenstein pointed out decades ago, a computer is not conscious in the way people are. It does not reflect, ponder, reconsider, regret, hope, care, question and  hypothesize — all of which are aspects of human consciousness or mind. A computer will not even do an analogue of weeping if I type in, “Dear Computer, although we’ve been intimately connected for six years, I’m going to terminate you and our relationship one minute from now.” The computer doesn’t have a mind-consciousness to know what that means and will go on functioning just as before — not because it doesn’t care but because it is incapable of doing anything else. It doesn’t even ‘not-care.’

The habit of ascribing consciousness to computers is just a scientific misapplication of a literary technique called personification. Personification is not intended to be taken literally — and one would expect scientists and philosophers to know better.

Let’s look closer. The meaning of the ‘break-up’ message to my computer is not in the physical blips on the screen; no amount of scientific analysis of those blips will even begin to hint at the existence of any meaning. However, say those words to your spouse and you’ll get a different response because he or she knows what they mean — and will react accordingly. Your spouse has a mind-consciousness capable of comprehending a non-physical meaning. This mind-consciousness must be non-physical because if it were not, we would be back at the ‘electronic blip problem.’ The brain, after all, is only a ‘meat-computer’ using electro-chemical blips that are also inherently devoid of meaning.

To cut to the chase: if the twin problems of mind-consciousness and meaning lack — even in principle — a physical explanation, then it is not inherently illogical to propose a non-physical entity as the origin of a non-physical phenomenon. Since physical nature cannot explain it, then perforce we must seek a non-physical origin. Eventually, this leads us to God as the origin of consciousness. The problem cannot be solved by simply more scientific, i.e. physicalist research. Put in this context, the theist’s proposition is eminently reasonable.

Once we have established a non-physical origin for consciousness, we can then go on to talk about different concepts of that non-physical entity (that some call ‘God’) and its alleged wishes for humankind. We can also go on to consider why it might make consciousness necessary to enjoy the world or if God wishes us to enjoy it. But for now, it suffices to note that Shook shoe-horns these topics into his faux syllogism to set it up as a straw-man or parody.

Next time: Shook on pseudo-cosmology— is God the necessary condition for the Universe?

=================== References ==================

1 John R Shook, The God Debates, p. 88.

2 See the latest issue of Philosophy Now, Nov-Dec. 2011.The theme is “Brains and Minds.”

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The Grand Design

This is the fifth and final installment in Ian Kluge’s series on Hawking and Mlodinow’s The Grand Design.

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Ian Kluge

The reference to something transcending matter is, of course, a reference to God in His ontological fu nction i.e. God as the source and ground of being, not the “personal” God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. This “God of the philosophers” is independent of all physical entities; He transcends it, and is therefore, not subject to the limitations of time, space and causality that restrict material things.

We now reach a crucial point in our argument. The ontological God is the only rational choice left to us in explaining the origin of the universe and its laws and attributes because as we have seen above, purely immanent, physical, scientific explanations lead to an infinite regress that violate the principle of sufficient reason and give no final answer. God is not arbitrarily chosen or shoe-horned into the discussion. He is recognized as the only remaining rational choice we have given the failure of the scientific explanations. In other words, a full explanation of the existence of the universe requires recognition of something transcendent. Conversely, no scientific explanation of the existence of the universe which ignores the transcendent is complete.

Here science and religion have been unified or harmonized insofar as science and religion (belief in a God of some kind) need each other to complete their explanations in a logically viable way.

This leads to a scientific view of God. Until someone devises a viable, completely  immanent physical argument showing how the universe arose the way it did without starting an infinite linear or circular regress, we will have to accept an ontological vision of God as our best available, i.e. most rational explanation. Call it ‘provisional theism’ if you like, though I don’t think there is anything provisional about it since dismissing this argument requires making changes to the nature of matter and natural law – which is, to put it mildly, extremely unlikely.

Finally, Hawking and Mlodinow claim that theirs is “a model of a universe that creates itself” (181). For the reasons given above, this model is not logically viable, but that still leaves something to be clarified. As used by the authors, the phrase “creates itself” means “creates itself” literally out of nothing because of gravity. But, of course, they do not mean ‘nothing’ in the logical sense of absolute absence, but rather ‘nothing’ in the quantum sense of infinite potential energy which can have spontaneous fluctuations. Such fluctuations are not possible in absolute absence. If something fluctuates in absolute absence, we are obviously not dealing with absolute absence. This leads to a familiar problem for Hawking and Mlodinow: how did their nothing acquire the capacity to have spontaneous fluctuations? How did these fluctuations acquire their particular characteristics. Furthermore, claiming that the universe “creates itself” raises the question of the origins of this capacity as well as the laws by which it creates. As shown above, purely immanent, physical explanations are not logically viable.

Hawking and Mlodinow’s also put far too much emphasis on M-theory as the basis of their radical conclusions. As Steven Weinberg puts it so gently, they “make this fundamental theory seem a little better understood than it actually is.” (Steven Weinberg, “The Universes We Still Don’t Know,” NY Review of Books, Feb. 10, 2011). In other words, they exaggerate its explanatory power, scope and effectiveness. According to Weinberg, the basic problem with M-theory is that it is “not a fundamental theory itself” (ibid.) but only a series of proposed solutions to “an unknown fundamental theory” (ibid.). Whether or not this is a suitable foundation on which to base their far-reaching conclusions remains to be seen.

Intellectually speaking, The Grand Design is a weak book, worth reading only because Hawking is listed as the principle author. In other words, we read The Grand Design to find out what a great physicist is thinking – and come to realize that when he ventures from physics into philosophy, he is clearly out of his depth. He has, in his own words, “not kept up” (5) even as far as 18th century philosophy and shows little or no awareness of the derivation of his ideas – be it Kant or some forms of postmodernism – or of their philosophical implications.

This is ultimately a book for enthusiasts, i.e. for new atheists wishing to magnify their claims by attaching them to a great name. It is not a book for those of serious philosophical bent who wish to explore their ideas seriously.

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The Grand Design

Ian Kluge

This is the fourth in a series of commentaries on Hawking and Mlodinow’s The Grand Design by Common Ground contributor Ian Kluge.

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Doing Away with God

Hawking and Mlodinow propose to do away with God as a necessary part of explaining the existence of the universe. They believe that the three “why? questions” (171) can be answered “purely within the realm of science, and without invoking any divine beings” (172). These questions are (1) “Why is there something rather than nothing?” (2) “Why do we exist?” and (3) “Why this particular set of laws and not some other?” (171).

There are at least two major difficulties with the author’s attempts to answer these questions. The first is that they violate the principle of sufficient reason. In its Leibnizian formulation this principle asserts that no statement is true unless it contains a sufficient reason why it cannot be otherwise. Another variation states that no event X occurs unless there is a sufficient reason why X occurs and not something else, i.e. Y. A sufficient reason is one that makes other alternatives impossible. In concrete terms, the principle means that there must be a sufficient, i.e. necessary reason why cream warms up when I add it to hot coffee instead of turning to ice. Scientific research, of course, is the business of finding sufficient reasons for physical events. Therefore, when the search for sufficient reasons is abandoned science itself has been left behind.

The principle of sufficient reason quickly highlights the problems with Hawking’s and Mlodinow’s argument vis-à-vis God. In its most general terms the problem concerns explaining why the universe is a lawful place, i.e. one in which science can observe necessary regularities of behavior.

Newton’s laws, for example, explain not only that things fall, and the manner in which they fall, but also why they necessarily fall in this way. This brings us to a question: what or who established the law? The law cannot establish itself since that involves the self-contradiction of having to exist before it exists. We can try to establish its existence by referring to other physical laws – but that only leads us to an infinite regress of references to still other laws, and, therefore, fails to to give us any answer at all since an infinite regress by its nature gives no final answer. Nor does an infinite regress satisfy the principle of sufficient reason. A solution to this problem eludes Hawking and Mladinow again and again. They do not seem to realize that any purely immanent answer, i.e. answer that remains strictly within the realm of physical events and laws leads to an infinite regress and, thereby, ceases to be scientific. More succinctly, nature does not explain itself, i.e. no inherently material explanation of the universe is logically sustainable.

Any attempt to explain why physical laws and attributes exist by means of other physical laws and attributes fails one of the basic tests of rationality, namely, the principle of sufficient reason. Such an attempt does not provide a final explanation of why things must be the way they are, i.e. they fail to conclusively answer all three of the ontological questions the authors promise to resolve. ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ is not answered by referring to an infinite regress of laws. ‘Why do we exist?’ is not answered by telling us that the “universe creates itself” (181) because that still leaves open the question of the source of this capacity to create itself. Simply positing this is merely to stop asking questions – which is not a scientific procedure. ‘Why this particular set of laws and not others?’ is not answered by telling us that there are other laws that demand the existence of this particular law because this, too, merely starts an infinite regress.

Here is a specific example. Hawking and Mlodinow write, “[o]ne requirement of any law of nature must satisfy is that it dictates that the energy of an isolated body surrounded by empty spaces is positive, which means that one has to do work to assemble the body” (179). On this basis they explain why there is no reason “that bodies could not appear anywhere and everywhere” (179). The problem is obvious. Why “must” any law of nature satisfy this requirement? To say that other laws of nature require it, simply starts an infinite regress about explaining the attributes of the other laws and how these attributes arose. Consequently, Hawking and Mlodinow provide no final explanation at all if we remain within the confines of the material realm, i.e. within the limits of physical science.

This leads to two conclusions. First, any attempt to explain why physical laws and attributes exist by means of other physical laws and attributes fails one of the basic tests of rationality, namely, the principle of sufficient reason. Such attempts does not provide a final explanation of why things must be the way they are, i.e. they fail to conclusively answer all three of the ontological questions the authors promise to resolve. ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ is not answered by referring to an infinite regress of laws. ‘Why do we exist?’ is not answered by telling us that the “universe creates itself” (181) because that still leaves open the question of the source of this capacity to create itself. Simply positing this capacity is simply to stop asking questions – which is not a scientific procedure. ‘Why this particular set of laws and not others?’ is not answered by telling us that there are other laws that demand the existence of this particular law because this too merely starts an infinite regress.

The second conclusion is that if we want an ultimate explanation that does not degenerate into an infinite regress, we will have to accept that such an explanation will logically involve a non-physical factor, i.e. something that transcends matter and its intrinsic limitations. Anything that does not transcend matter inevitably involves infinite regress of physical laws. From this it follows that nature does not explain itself, i.e. no purely, inherent material explanation of the universe is logically sustainable. The problems mentioned by Hawking and Mlodinow at the beginning of Chapter 8 are intrinsically unsolvable by physical, i.e. scientific explanations alone.

There is another, albeit related problem with Hawking’s and Mlodinow’s argument. If the number of physical laws is infinite, then, of course, we get a linear infinite regress. However, if there is only a limited number of physical laws, the infinite regress becomes circular.  Sooner or later we will arrive back at the very first law we are trying to explain – and off we go again, around and around forever in a circular  variation of the infinite regress. Both possibilities clearly demonstrate the untenability of purely immanent, physical explanations of the universe, its laws and its attributes.

Next time: The Logic of God

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Ian Kluge

In this third part of my review of The Grand Design (Stephen Hawking & Leonard Mlodinow), I’d like to take a closer look at their theory of “model-dependent realism”(42).

This is one of Hawking’s and Mlodinow’s main contributions in The Grand Design. According to this theory:

a physical theory or world-picture is a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the model to observations. This provides a framework with which to interpret modern science. (43)

In their view “to model-dependent realism it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation” (46); moreover, if two different models agree with observations, we cannot know which one is “more real than another” (46). This is only wordplay – saying that a “model is real” means precisely that it agrees with observation.

What else could it mean? How can a model “agree with observation” of nature and not be “real” i.e. not correspond to the reality it models? If a model makes testable predictions which are validated, the very fact of validation means something about the model is correct, i.e. corresponds to reality and, therefore, provides real information about nature. Clearly, Hawking and Mlodinow are trying to establish a distinction between ‘agreeing with observation’ and ‘being real’ – but what purpose can such a distinction serve in the pursuit of science? Imagine it being applied in virology: our model correctly predicts the nature and behavior of a deadly virus – but that’s no reason to make a vaccine, since the agreement with the model doesn’t tell us anything real about the virus. Who would accept such reasoning, let alone act on it?

The ultimate, and devastating consequence of accepting this line of thought is that it makes science impossible. Science is no longer a quest for knowledge about the world or nature; it is the quest for knowledge about our theories or models of the world – which is a very different thing. According to model-dependent realism, there is no such thing as scientific knowledge of nature but only knowledge of our own models. And even that is undermined by degeneration into an infinite regress, for when we check a model against our observations, we must also have a model of what constitutes ‘an observation’ and that model requires further observations which in turn must be checked against our model and so on. Furthermore, we cannot even know our own models, because to make a model we have to have a model of models, (and observe whether our model of models agrees with the models we check) and then a model of the model of models and so on ad infinitum.

This catches Hawking and Mlodinow in a logical tangle from which there is no escape: we cannot know nature (as they admit), but neither can we really know what a ‘model’ or an ‘observation’ is. The clear upshot is that science as the quest for knowledge about nature is impossible.

Hence, Hawking’s view covertly carries within it a profound and corrosive skepticism about the possibility of real knowledge about nature. All we can know are our models – and ultimately, as we have seen above, not even those. Moreover, if all knowledge is model-dependent, can we know anything about anything since all we can really know is whether or not our observations agree with our model? It is, after all, “pointless to ask whether a model is real” (46) i.e. whether a model gives knowledge about reality. This skepticism is precisely why Hawking and Mlodinow can undermine the whole concept of progress in science by claiming that the Copernican model is merely more convenient and not more correct than the Ptolemaic model of the solar system. There is no progress because there is no true model or knowledge about nature – only more or less convenient models for whatever our purpose happens to be. That, of course, reduces ‘truth’ to whatever we want it to be.

Next time: Whence “model-dependent realism”?

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Ian Kluge

This is the second in a series of discussions of Hawking and Mlodinow’s The Grand Design. Today: 

The Logic of Multiverses

Multiverses are another source of logical difficulties for Hawking and Mlodinow. The Grand Design claims that the existence of multiverses can explain why the universe we inhabit is fine-tuned for life without resorting to God as an explanation.

In an infinite array of possible universes, one that contains life is likely or even inevitably bound to appear. Saying that a universe fit for humankind is likely to show up is, in fact, a covert appeal to the laws of probability – which raises the question of the origin of the laws of probability. Are they ‘just there’? If so, Hawking has resurrected God – the only totally independent entity – under another name.

Did these laws develop through the interaction of particles? If so, how did the particles get the capacity to develop natural laws? How did the particles develop the capacity to interact with one another?

And how could we answer such questions by means of the scientific method, which requires prediction and observation?

Clearly, Hawking’s multiverse suggestion leaves science behind.

If, on the other hand, the appearance of multiverses were truly random, then we could not determine that any result was likely, unlikely, inevitable or impossible. This negates Hawking’s claim that countless multiverses can explain the origin of this finely tuned universe. An explanation must tell us why something happened, must happen or is likely to happen – and if the appearance of universes is purely random, we cannot know any of these things.

Simply claiming that because there are so many of these multiverses a world like ours must appear is like saying that sand-castles must appear on the beach because there are trillions of trillions of grains of sand. Well, no . . . For building sand-castles, sand-grains are necessary but not sufficient causes.  Clearly, multiverses by themselves are not sufficient for explaining the existence of a finely tuned universe.

Next time: Model-dependent realism

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Ian Kluge

Ian Kluge reviews The Grand Design

Stephen Hawking’s and Leonard Mlodinow’s The Grand Design begins with a grand or perhaps, grandiose, claim that “philosophy is dead” and goes on from there. The book proceeds to tell us that an infinite stack of multiverses – instead of turtles – explains our allegedly ‘fine-tuned’ existence on earth. For good measure, the authors throw in what they think is a new philosophy of science, model-dependent realism, and, thus, demolish free will.

They also add elaborate faith-statements about M-Theory, which, as Nobel-Laureate Steven Weinberg points out, is not nearly so well established or useful as Hawking would have us believe. The book ends by asserting that gravity, not God, is the reason why there is something rather than nothing.

Philosophy is Dead

Hawking’s claim that “philosophy is dead” (5) is such a sweeping over-generalization that it is hard to know what it actually means. He thinks, “Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics” (5).  Does he mean philosophy of science? Or ontology? Or medical ethics? Philosophy of physics? Postmodernism? If so, then it is pretty clear he is the one who is just catching up with philosophy and perhaps needs to read a little more broadly in modern books on all these subjects. Given his claim, it is ironic that his supposedly ‘new’ model-dependent realism is a hash of warmed-over Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962), postmodernist epistemology and, above all, 18th Century Kantian idealism. As we shall see below, this model makes science impossible.

The problems begin early in the book. (We’ll pass over the history-of-science “howlers”, like the claim that Aristotle, the father of biology, rejected observation.) In trying to answer the question about the origin of natural law, Hawking conflates and confuses two issues: (1) the existence of God as the ground of being or origin of all that exists and (2) God’s relationship to creation, such as making exceptions to the natural laws He established. In other words, Hawking confuses the question of God’s existence as the source of natural law with the question about God’s interference in His laws.

Two Different Questions

These are two fundamentally different questions and can be answered independently of one another. It is quite possible – as deists like Hume did – to say that God exists as the author of all, including natural law, without subscribing to divine interference,  or ‘miracles’ as understood by Hawking. Claiming that we cannot believe in God without believing in miracles is logical nonsense. There is no absolutely necessary connection between the two ideas. The Bahá’í Writings recognize this fact: they do not deny the possibility of miracles but do not make belief in God dependent on them, and, indeed, de-emphasize them.

According to Hawking, if we distinguish God’s existence from His miraculous deeds, God becomes “no more than a definition of God as the embodiment of the laws of nature” (29). Even if this were true, why would it be a problem? Saying that the laws of
nature are divine keeps divinity in our world-picture as surely as saying a transcendent  God created all natural laws. Such a world-picture differs significantly from a purely naturalistic world-picture which denies the divine altogether and ascribes everything to chance or quantum fluctuations. The presence of divinity in whatever form – even as a pantheistic God Who embodies natural law –influences not only science vis-à-vis our understanding of causality, but also fundamental issues of ontic, social, legal and spiritual value.

In one view, we are the ‘children’ of the divine, in the other a by-product of chance combinations of matter. On the other hand, if Hawking means more than a pantheistic God, i.e. God as the author of the laws, then it is clear that as creator, God transcends the laws He makes, just as any artist transcends his own work. Here, too, as the maker of laws that allow the formation of life, God becomes a source of value as well as understanding vis-à-vis causality and cosmic order. Contrary to Hawking’s claim, the subject of miracles has nothing to do with the differences in these two world-pictures.

Hawking and Mlodinow follow the Humean view, that a miracle is necessarily an exception to the laws of nature. God breaks the rules He made. Hawking shows how this view is irrational.  But this is not the only possible explanation of miracles. First, there is the explanation by secondary causes. In other words, God works through the laws of nature to achieve effects that contradict our expectations and usual experience. He uses natural laws in ways we have not yet discovered. Consequently, no break with natural law is required. Theoretically, if scientists could get enough knowledge, they might even be able to understand how some miracles ‘work’ – i.e. miracles could become quite ‘scientific.’

Scientific Determinism

Furthermore, contrary to what Hawking claims, scientific determinism would not “exclude the possibility of miracles or an active role for God” (30) because God acts through not against natural laws. Such a conclusion fits in well with the Bahá’í Writings which state “No thing have I perceived, except that I perceived God within it, God before it, or God after it.” (Gleanings from the Writings of Baha’u'llah, p. 178). Since God is “in” things, S/he may act through or by means of them.

A second possible take on miracles comes from quantum physics. This view defines a miracle as an event of an extremely low order of probability. Quantum physics has established that in the last analysis, all laws are probabilistic i.e. do not operate with 100% guaranteed results in all cases (72). A genuine miracle then, is a highly unlikely – but not impossible – event. Coins can land on their edge. Not often. But they can. Philosophically speaking, this lets us doubt that miracles have occurred but does not allow us to prove they cannot – which is what Hawking seeks (unsuccessfully) to do.

In both of these theories about miracles, God can interfere in nature without breaking any physical laws though He can use them in ways we do not expect. In this case, however, the problem is with our knowledge and expectations and not with God even if Hawking would have it the other way around. Of course, this does not mean we must believe all miracle stories in all religions – indeed, we may choose to believe none – but it does mean that we cannot logically rule out the possibility of miracles a priori.

Next time: Hawking and Mlodinow on multi-verses.

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Ian Kluge

As is to be expected, there are far more differences than similarities between the new atheist philosophies and the Bahá’í Writings—though the extent of the similarities and their foundational nature is surprising.

The question remains, however, “Are these similarities enough to allow a meaningful dialogue between the two?”

Can the differences between the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings be bridged? In other words, is there anything the two can build on together?

On the foundational issues there is no common ground: they cannot agree on

1. the existence or non-existence of super-natural or super-sensible beings (God) or realities (Abha Kingdom, Holy Spirit). [ontology]
2. the adequacy or inadequacy of the scientific method and reason as the sole determinants of what constitutes genuine knowledge. [epistemology]
3. the new atheist belief that religion is inherently pathological and no longer has a part in humankind’s future evolution.

Change on any of these issues would require a reassessment of core identities.

On the accidental or non-foundational level, there are several bases for dialogue and building together.

1. the evolutionary outlook on religion: the Bahá’í doctrine of progressive revelation, which can help the new atheists sharpen their analysis to avoid the problem of presentism
2. the need to eliminate religious prejudice and a frank recognition of the crimes committed in the name of religion.
3. respect for science and reason and a continued dialogue about their nature.
4. the independent investigation of truth.
5. ethical realism, ontological realism and correspondence epistemology—i.e. the new atheist and the Bahá’í opposition to various forms of contemporary philosophy which reject realism in these areas.

Whether or not such a dialogue can take place depends entirely, of course, on the willingness of the participants. The floor is open.

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Ian Kluge

Along with a realist ethics and a realist epistemology, the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings share a realist ontology. In its simplest terms, ontology is one’s theory of reality, its nature and modes of being. Although ontology seems far removed from ordinary human concerns, all human beings and cultures possess an ontology, although it is usually unconscious. For example, the simple statement, “I shall walk the dog” assumes (a) that an “I” exists in some way, (b) that “I” could make such a decision, (c) the dog exists in some way, (d) that “I” and the dog are distinct and separate entities, exterior to each other, (e) that motion is possible and real and that (f) the city street outside also exists. While this may seem self-evident to some, to others, such as those who believe the world is an illusion, or who believe that the self is an illusion, none of these points are necessarily obvious.

It is undeniable that the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings disagree about the ontology in regards to the existence or non-existence of any super-sensible reality. Naturally, the new atheists reject the super-natural. However, they do agree with the Writings that the world is real in its own right—i.e. exists independently of human perception and possess some “principle, foundation, or reality”159 which gives it existence in itself. In SAQ, Abdu’l-Bahá flatly rejects the view that reality is a phantasm created by humankind:

Certain sophists think that existence is an illusion, that each being is an absolute illusion which has no existence– in other words, that the existence of beings is like a mirage, or like the reflection of an image in water or in a mirror, which is only an appearance having in itself no principle, foundation or reality. This theory is erroneous.160

It is noteworthy that Abdu’l-Bahá refers to those who maintain that the world is an “absolute illusion” as “sophists,” a term traditionally associated with flawed and deceptive reasoning. Use of this term signals his rejection of “illusionism” or “phenomenalism” which is confirmed by his statement that “[t]his theory is erroneous.”

Further support for ontological realism is found in Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement that “each being”161 in the exterior world is real—i.e. it possesses some “principle, foundation, or reality”162 which gives it some degree of existence “in itself.” In other words, “each being” has at least some degree of innate existence, is individual, is distinct and possesses some detachment or independence from other beings and is, in that sense, unique. As Abdu’l-Bahá’ says in a later section of this passage, “in their own degree they [things in the exterior world] exist.”163 Each thing “in the condition of being [] has a real and certain existence.”164 They are not mere “appearances” of something els—i.e. epiphenomena, passive side-effects or by-products that possesses no “principle, foundation or reality” of their own. This idea is re-enforced by the following statement:

for though the existence of beings in relation to the existence of God is an illusion, nevertheless, in the condition of being it has a real and certain existence. It is futile to deny this. For example, the existence of the mineral in comparison with that of man is nonexistence . . . .; but the mineral has existence in the mineral world . . . Then it is evident that although beings in relation to the existence of God have no existence, but are like the mirage or the reflections in the mirror, yet in their own degree they exist.165

This statement makes it unequivocally clear that according to `Abdu’l-Bahá while degrees of reality differ, every being is, in its own degree, undeniably real. It is worth noting that he flatly rejects any contradictory viewpoint: “It is futile to deny this,” he says, thereby foreclosing any argument to the contrary.  He emphasizes the reality of creation elsewhere by stating “Now this world of existence in relation to its maker is a real phenomenon.”166 In other words, it has its own, undeniable degree of reality.

The new atheists also accept the objective reality of the exterior world, which they understand as being purely material or physical and amenable to adequate study by the scientific method. Of course, where the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings differ is whether the objectively known reality, which exists independently of human perception and possess its own degree of reality, is limited to the physical or includes the super-sensible. This is a serious difference but it should not blind us to the fundamental agreement about ontological realism.

Ironically on this, and the previously noted fundamental philosophical issues, the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings share more common ground with each other than they do with postmodernist philosophy.

Next time: I wrap up and look see what conclusions can be drawn from this discussion.

======================= References =====================
158 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 221; emphasis added. 159 `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278. 160 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278. 161 `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278. 162 `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278. 163 `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278. 164 `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278. 165 `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278; emphasis added. 166 `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 280; emphasis added.

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Ian Kluge

The agreement between the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings on ethical realism has far-reaching implications—in the area of epistemology for example. If there are universal, objectively knowable (and innate) ethical standards, then it follows that at least some knowledge is objective, that it is possible to evaluate at least some knowledge vis-à-vis truth and falseness. This lays the basis for an objective epistemology, i.e. the claim that all truth-claims are not necessarily mere individual or cultural constructions without correspondence to reality.

The new atheists’ adherence to an objective epistemology is self-evident from even the most cursory survey of their books; after all, the whole enterprise of science is predicated on the principle that our discoveries correspond to or tell us something about reality. There may be interpretational differences whether this knowledge is about reality in itself or about reality in inter-action with us, but in the final analysis we gain some testable and objective knowledge about reality itself. This agrees with Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement that “the rational soul gradually discover[s] … [and] comprehends the realities, the properties and the effects of contingent beings.”154 In other words, the rational soul does not construct these realities—these “realities” exist independently of the human perceiver.

Elsewhere `Abdu’l-Bahá states,

the rational soul as far as human ability permits discovers the realities of things and becomes cognizant of their peculiarities and effects, and of the qualities and properties of beings.”155

Again, the emphasis is on discovery and on acquiring knowledge, becoming “cognizant” of the attributes of things. These properties are not “subjective,” i.e. ascribed to things by humankind either as individuals or as cultures. Here is another statement from Abdu’l-Bahá:

The mind and the thought of man sometimes discover truths, and from this thought and discovery signs and results are produced. This thought has a foundation. But many things come to the mind of man which are like the waves of the sea of imaginations; they have no fruit, and no result comes from them.156

Here Abdu’l-Bahá goes into more detail. Discoveries lead to “thought [that] has a foundation”— i.e. a foundation in reality or corresponding to reality. This, in effect, asserts an objective, correspondence theory of truth in which correct thought has a “foundation” or basis in reality, which is to say, corresponds to reality. `Abdu’l-Bahá also differentiates such thought from imaginations which he says lead to no real results. He also states,

Reflect that man’s power of thought consists of two kinds. One kind is true, when it agrees with a determined truth. Such conceptions find realization in the exterior world; such are accurate opinions, correct theories, scientific discoveries and inventions.157

Here he speaks specifically of a knowledge that “agrees with a determined truth,” i.e. knowledge that corresponds to reality. He also provides a test for this knowledge: it leads to “accurate opinions” and “correct theories” which conform to reality as well as to discoveries and inventions. In other words, such knowledge has real results testable with the reality in question.

Abdu’l-Bahá reinforces the correspondence theory of knowledge in a variety of statements. As already noted, he states that “Philosophy consists in comprehending the reality of things as they exist, according to the capacity and the power of man.”158 To comprehend “the reality of things as they exist” is nothing other than to have one’s knowledge correspond to reality. Naturally, this comprehension is limited by our capacities but this does not mean that what we do in fact comprehend does not correspond to reality.

For example, the statement that the interior angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees is true—but only in plane geometry. This statement is true but limited. The same holds for our true but limited knowledge of reality.

=========================== References =============================
154 `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 217—218; emphasis added. 155 `Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208. 156 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 253; emphasis added. 157 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 251; see also 3, 9; emphasis added.

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Ian Kluge

Although the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings disagree about the role of religion in ethics, they do agree on ethical realism—i.e. the view that moral beliefs are not simply a matter of individual preference but rather that “in ethics, as in physics, there are truths waiting to be discovered—and thus we can be right or wrong in our beliefs about them.”151

This view is already implicit in their belief in some kind of universal ethical intuition (see my earlier blog on the subject) which can be applied to all peoples at all times. Leaving aside the issue of how this universal ethical intuition might be manifested in different evolutionary circumstances, the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings can agree that certain ethical virtues are objectively valid, among them compassion and goodwill,152 justice and fairness, tolerance, generosity and a dedication to truth.

An ethical realist position also means that the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings agree on the rejection of relativism in ethics—i.e. they agree that ethical viewpoints are more than reflections of person preferences. They reject the view that we cannot judge ethical viewpoints because we lack an objective, Archimedean standpoint from which to make judgements.

For the new atheists, this standard consists in our innate moral intuitions, and for Bahá’ís, this standard is established by God and is sometimes available through the moral intuitions of our spiritual nature.

The issue of ethical realism gives the new atheists and the Bahá’í Writings common ground in their opposition to ethical relativism as exemplified in postmodern philosophy.153 It also provides common ground in regards to the essential unity of human nature, in regards to ethical intuitions and their possible genetic basis, i.e. a universal human nature which provides an objective basis for unity.

Next time: Objective Correspondence Epistemology

====================== References =======================
151 Sam Harris, The End of Faith, p. 181. 152 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, 301. 153 See Ian Kluge, “Postmodernism and the Bahá’í Writings,” and “Relativism and the Bahá’í Writings,” published in Lights of Irfan.

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Ian Kluge

The new atheists certainly agree that the quest for truth should be independent—i.e. unhindered by religious institutions such as the Inquisition or by religious beliefs. Otherwise, how can we know what the truth is on any subject? As Abdu’l-Bahá says,

The first is the independent investigation of truth; for blind imitation of the past will stunt the mind. But once every soul inquireth into truth, society will be freed from the darkness of continually repeating the past.147

Elsewhere he says,

God has conferred upon and added to man a distinctive power, the faculty of intellectual investigation into the secrets of creation, the acquisition of higher knowledge, the greatest virtue of which is scientific enlightenment.148

Bearing in mind that science here does not refer to naturalistic or material scientism that Abdu’l-Bahá rejects elsewhere149, we see that the quest for knowledge is one of humankind’s distinguishing features. This independent investigation is necessary not just for a few but for “every soul” so that all human beings can take responsibility for what they believe.

Consequently, there can be no inherent objection to a Bahá’í investigating the new atheism and testing its arguments by the standards of logic, philosophy, science, history and theology. Nor is there any objection to Dennett’s suggestion that we teach children “about all the world’s religions, in a matter of fact, historically and biologically informed way.”150 The only stipulation would be that such teaching must be complete—i.e. students must also be equipped with understanding of the inherent limitations of naturalistic science, so that their understanding may be conscious and critical and so that one faith-based preference is not simply replaced by another. In that way, each individual will be able to be able to give informed consent to whatever ideas she or he adopts.

Next time: Ethical realism

============================ References ===========================
147 Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections from the Writings of Abdu’l-Bahá, p. 248. 148 Abdu’l-Bahá, Bahá’í World Faith, p. 244. 149 Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 262, 311. 150 Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 327.

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Ian Kluge

Another significant area of agreement between the Bahá’í Writings and the new atheists is importance of reason and science in human existence. Since we have already explored the new atheism’s commitments to reason and rationality in the previous section, we shall point out a few Bahá’í statements on this subject to show that a basis for dialogue exists. For example, Abdu’l-Bahá says that “in this age the peoples of the world need the arguments of reason.”141 Elsewhere he proclaims, “Science is an effulgence of the Sun of Reality, the power of investigating and discovering the verities of the universe, the means by which man finds a pathway to God.”142 He sees no inherent and necessary conflict between reason, science and religion, a concept emphasized in the following:

The third principle or teaching of Bahá’u'lláh is the oneness of religion and science. Any religious belief which is not conformable with scientific proof and investigation is superstition, for true science is reason and reality, and religion is essentially reality and pure reason; therefore, the two must correspond.143

Also:

Material science is the investigation of natural phenomena; divine science is the discovery and realization of spiritual verities. The world of humanity must acquire both . . . Both are necessary–one the natural, the other super-natural; one material, the other divine.144

Finally, he points out the intimate connection between faith, belief and rationality, making clear that irrational faith is not just undesirable but essentially impossible:

Unquestionably there must be agreement between true religion and science. If a question be found contrary to reason, faith and belief in it are impossible, and there is no outcome but wavering and vacillation.145

These statements demonstrate that according to the Bahá’í Writings, faith is not just “belief without evidence”146 or “blind faith.” Indeed, in the foregoing quotation, Abdu’l-Bahá makes it clear that genuine faith in opposition to reason cannot exist since it leads to “wavering and vacillation.” Faith must include knowledge and understanding, because without them, even the strongest commitment is bound to weaken.

Abdu’l-Bahá’s pronouncements potentially form the basis for a far-reaching dialogue about the nature, strengths and limitations of reason, as well as the relationship between reason, science and religious faith. However, it must be admitted that such a dialogue will be fraught with challenges given the new atheist’s insistence on a positivist and materialist view of science and reason and the Bahá’í Writings’ allegiance to moderate rationalism and to belief in the super-sensible.

Next time: The independent investigation of truth

================================ References ==========================
141 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 7. 142 Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 49. 143 Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 107. 144 Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 138. 145 Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 181. 146 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 232;

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Ian Kluge

Another area of significant agreement between the Bahá’í Writings and the new atheists concerns the crimes that have often been committed in the name of religion, not to mention injustice and corruption. The Writings make no effort to conceal or sweeten the misdeeds that have been perpetrated under the guise of religious teachings. Frank recognition of these sad developments is integral to the doctrine of progressive revelation since all religions and civilizations follow the seasonal cycle which begins with a pure spring inspired by revelation but ends with a winter in which, according to Abdu’l-Bahá,

only the name of the Religion of God remains, and the exoteric forms of the divine teachings. The foundations of the Religion of God are destroyed and annihilated, and nothing but forms and customs exist. Divisions appear . . .131

Elsewhere he says,

The beginnings of all great religions were pure; but priests, taking possession of the minds of the people, filled them with dogmas and superstitions, so that religion became gradually corrupt.132

These corruptions led to false doctrines that encouraged war and destruction:

I wish to explain to you the principal reason of the unrest among nations. The chief cause is the misrepresentation of religion by the religious leaders and teachers. They teach their followers to believe that their own form of religion is the only one pleasing to God . . . Hence arise among the peoples, disapproval, contempt, disputes and hatred. If these religious prejudices could be swept away, the nations would soon enjoy peace and concord.133

In the words of Christopher Hitchens, “religion has been an enormous multiplier of tribal suspicion and hatred, with members of each group talking of the other in precisely the tones of the bigot.”134 Overcoming these prejudices and divisions is the purpose of Baha’u’lláh’s mission:

The utterance of God is a lamp, whose light is these words: Ye are the fruits of one tree, and the leaves of one branch. Deal ye one with another with the utmost love and harmony, with friendliness and fellowship . . . So powerful is the light of unity that it can illuminate the whole earth.135

The Writings also denounce religion’s attempts to suppress the development of science,136 the ignorance of the clergy,137 the undue wealth of the churches compared to the poverty of Christ and the masses138, and its interference in politics, among other things.139 Although the Bahá’í Writings do not express themselves as flamboyantly as the new atheists, they are equally clear in condemning the abuses perpetrated by religion and are equally determined to eliminate such practices. Moreover, like the new atheist philosophies, the Writings view the elimination of religion as a better alternative to continued division and conflict: “If religion becomes the source of antagonism and strife, the absence of religion is to be preferred.”140

The Bahá’í Faith and the new atheists differ on this issue only insofar as the new atheists want to remedy this problem by abolishing religion altogether as an irremediable destructive force, while the Bahá’í Faith sees the solution in progressive revelation and above all, in the revelation of Baha’u’llah. In the Bahá’í view, atheism and strictly man-made moral systems will not achieve the desired goal of a world that is at peace with itself and its environment.

However, we must not forget that the new atheists and the Bahá’í Revelation are responses to the same problem, i.e. global disunity, ignorance and the depredations of corrupt religion. This fact forms a basis for positive dialogue with the new atheists despite the difference in solutions. Unfortunately, the dogmatic denial that religion has anything worthwhile to contribute to such a debate makes such a dialogue unlikely.

Next time: Respect for science and reason

======================== References =============================
131 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 74. 132 Abdu’l-Bahá, Abdu’l-Bahá in London, p. 125; see also The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 406. 133 Abdu’l-Bahá, Paris Talks, p. 45—46; see also The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 265. 134 Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great, p. 36. 135 Baha’u'llah, Gleanings from the Writings of Baha’u'llah, p. 288. 136 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 137. 137 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 104. 138 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 135. 139 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 136. 140 Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 117.

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Ian Kluge

Because of their advocacy of the scientific method, the new atheists agree that religion should be explored and discussed in evolutionary terms. Dennett, for example, says that the super-natural creatures “that crowd the mythologies of every people are the imaginative offspring of a hyperactive habit of finding agency wherever anything puzzles or frightens us.”116

The HADD (hyper-action agent detection device), which started out as a coping mechanism, a “Good Trick, rapidly became a practical necessity of human life”117 and thereby came to control and blind us. Hitchens traces the origins of religion to earliest man’s “babyish attempts to meet our inescapable demand for knowledge.”118 Now that we have science, we have outgrown religion.

Dawkins presents two theories about the evolutionary origin of religion. In one, religion’s roots are the evolution-based tendency for children to “believe without question whatever your grown-ups tell you.”119 The other is that religion “is a by-product of the misfiring of several of these modules”120 (i.e. data processing units in the brain as it evolved). Thus religion is essentially pathological, “an accidental by-product—a misfiring of something useful.”121 The time has come to correct this widespread mistake.

From a Bahá’í perspective, there is no inherent difficulty with an evolutionary approach to understanding religion. Indeed, it is amazingly close to the teaching of progressive revelation according to which “the exoteric forms of the divine teachings”122 —which are adapted to physical, historical and cultural conditions—evolve over time, while the inner or “esoteric meaning”123 or “eternal verities”124 remain constant to meet the universal needs of our human nature. Each Emissary from or—to use Bahá’u’lláh’s terminology—Manifestation of God

restates the eternal verities enshrined in previous religions, coordinates their functions, distinguishes the essential and the authentic from the nonessential and spurious in their teachings, separates the God-given truths from the priest-prompted superstitions.125

The Bahá’í Writings agree with Hitchens that much of what passes for religion is man-made. By distinguishing the essential from the non-essential and the man-made from the God-given; however, the Manifestation renews religion, providing it with a new outward form appropriate to new circumstances and new teachings or restatements126 of universal truths suited to a new era. He cleanses religion of that which is “man-made.”127 Through this process of cleansing reform and augmentation, religion evolves and continues to evolve without any foreseeable end.

Consequently, Bahá’ís are not surprised to find that different—perhaps to us shocking—laws were proclaimed in earlier times, that different practices held sway along with substantially different beliefs. Rather than condemn them from our current viewpoint we should try to understand these laws, practices and beliefs as agents in creating a unified society, often struggling for survival against implacable enemies. What the progressive evolution of religion shows is that God works through history and within the limitations of human beings endowed with free will, who often find themselves caught in very difficult circumstances. In these circumstances, it may have been necessary to punish adultery or theft very harshly for the cohesion and well-being of the group.

We should also remember that perhaps one people was more receptive to or perhaps more needful of God’s message than others and, thereby, became a special vehicle for human religious evolution. Surrounded by mortal enemies, these peoples may have been forced to take what strikes us now as gratuitously harsh action.

From a Bahá’í perspective, there is no difficulty in saying that religion started with a HADD, for example, or has roots in a child’s trust in its parents. Hitchens informs us there would be no churches “if humanity had not been afraid of the weather, the dark, the plague, the eclipse and all manner of other things now easily explicable.”128 This may be true, but anyone who thinks this disproves the truth of religion is simply committing the genetic fallacy, a logical error according to which we de-value something on the basis of its origin instead of its present state.129

HADD, childish trust or childish fear are only the avenues by which religious phenomena first appeared in the world—and these avenues of emergence, determined as they are by their cultural circumstances, do not necessarily negate the truth value inherent in the beliefs that appear. Given the vulnerability of their rather short lives, it makes no sense to expect that our ancestors would have the same sophisticated religious understanding that is available in our day. However, their lack of sophistication does not prove they were not ‘onto something’ in their intuitions about super-sensible realities. If we demythologize these beliefs, we may indeed find valuable insights. 130

Next time: Crimes in the name of God.

========================= References ======================
116 Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell, p. 123.; 117 Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell, p. 116.;  118 Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great, p. 64.  119 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 203.  120 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 209.  121 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 218.  122 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 75. 123 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 120.  124 Shoghi Effendi, The Promised Day is Come, p. 108.  125 Shoghi Effendi, The Promised Day is Come, p. 108. 126 Shoghi Effendi, The Promised Day is Come, p. 108. 127 Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great, p. 99. 128 Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great, p. 65. 129 For example, Hitchens commits this fallacy in the chapter entitled “The Lowly Stamp of Their Origin”: Religion’s Corrupt Beginnings.” P. 155.  130 Paul Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher.

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Ian Kluge

The final issue I’d like to discuss with regard to the new atheism is presentism, i.e. the logical fallacy of evaluating past societies which existed in completely different physical, cultural, economic, social and psychological circumstances by the standards of 21st century ideals as developed in advanced post-industrial nations. Presentism is a particular form of the logical flaw known as anachronism which distorts our understanding of past societies and actions by introducing incongruous standards into our study of past societies. It is rooted in overlooking, ignoring or misunderstanding the fact that earlier historical circumstances may have required responses that would strike us as immoral.

Hitchens’ discussion of the Old and New Testaments represents the presentism found throughout the work of the new atheists. His discussion of the “pitiless teachings of the God of Moses”114 shows no awareness of the time-frame he is considering, nor of the cultural conditions and political circumstances with other tribes. The laws may, indeed, strike us as harsh or odd—but to expect the ancient Jews living in a ‘tough neighborhood’ to have been governed by laws suitable for 21st century post-industrial democracies shows enormous historical insensitivity. Speaking of Christ’s beatitudes, Hitchens writes, “several are absurd and show a primitive attitude to agriculture (this extends to all mentions of plowing and sowing, and all allusions to mustard and fig trees)”115 Why he would object to the agricultural references in parables delivered in a time when the vast majority of humans were involved in agriculture?

Ironically, the new atheists’ presentism is also a failure to adopt an evolutionary viewpoint on human development, a failure to recognize that just as humankind’s body has evolved, so has its capacity to understand moral and religious concepts. For that reason, expecting the same level of moral and religious understanding from ancient peoples living in wholly different circumstances is not a rational response.  Furthermore, presentism involves the new atheists in a self-contradiction with their declared evolutionary principles. Consequently, this self-contradiction undermines their claim to base their arguments in strictly rational and scientific principles.

Next time, I’d like to look at areas in which New Atheist thought converges with that of the Bahá’í Faith.

====================== References ==================================
114 Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great, p. 100.; 115 Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great, p. 118.

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Ian Kluge

One of the new atheists’ major problems from a Bahá’í perspective is their consistent literalism in reading Jewish, Christian and Muslim scripture. They read scripture in its explicit and most obvious sense and reject non-literal understandings. Dawkins rails against theologians who “employ their favourite trick of interpreting selected scriptures as ‘symbolic’ rather than literal. By what criteria do you decide which passages are symbolic, which literal?” 106 Assuming there is no rational answer, he simply continues his literalism, a practice supported by Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens. In this sense, the new atheists resemble their fundamentalist opponents who also have a strong tendency to literalist readings of scripture.

There are two kinds of problems with new atheist literalism. The first concerns their neglect of centuries, indeed, millennia of non-literalist interpretation of scripture. This is not the appropriate place for a survey of scriptural interpretation, so we shall be content with two examples from Christianity. Already as early as the 5th Century A.D., Augustine in his “The Literal Interpretation of Genesis” states that the creation story does not refer to seven actual days and that the time framework is not to be taken literally. The story conveys a spiritual meaning not a scientific account that can be expected to replicate modern cosmological findings. In more recent times, we have developed existential ways107 of reading scripture as well as Bultmann’s de-mythologizing which understand scripture as dealing with the possibilities and conditions of human existence and decision-making.108

In addition, we might consider the point that the spiritual teachings are communicated through “symbolic forms . . . which are designed to reach the more hidden levels in us of instinct, feeling, and intuition.”109 Dawkins seems unaware of these possibilities and gives no reasons why this history should be ignored, i.e. why we should simply accept his unsupported assertion that symbolic readings are all a “trick.”

Whether we read symbolically or literally depends entirely on how we understand the intention or main idea of scriptural passage or story. It need not always be to convey actual historical events. It may, for example, function as a ‘myth,’ i.e. as an account in external worldly terms of inner psychological and spiritual processes. It may be to convey the nature of (an) existential choice, such as Abraham’s or to draw attention to our need to recognize overwhelming and mysterious powers in our existence as in Job. In light of the history of scriptural interpretation, we can only conclude that the new atheists adopt literalism because it suits their polemical purpose of presenting religion in its most negative light.

From the viewpoint of the Bahá’í Writings, the second problem with literalism is that it precludes any non-literal or symbolic readings of scripture. Perhaps Abdu’l-Bahá sums up the Bahá’í
position most succinctly when he states “The texts of the Holy Books are all symbolical.”110 For example, in Some Answered Questions, Abdu’l-Bahá provides extensive symbolic interpretations of Biblical books and stories; indeed, of the story of Adam and Eve, he says “if the literal meaning of this story were attributed to a wise man, certainly all would logically deny that this arrangement, this invention, could have emanated from an intelligent being.”111 Clearly he recognizes its irrationality at the literal level. Similarly, Baha’u’lláh’s Kitab-i-Iqan (The Book of Certitude) is a non-literal, symbolic reading of portions of the Qu’ran and Muslim theological statements. Baha’u’lláh makes it clear that those who do not apprehend the inner, symbolic meaning of these terms, will inevitably suffer:

Yea, inasmuch as the peoples of the world have failed to seek from the luminous and crystal Springs of divine knowledge the inner meaning of God’s holy words, they therefore have languished, stricken and sore athirst, in the vale of idle fancy and waywardness.112

Insofar as the new atheism has confined itself to the outward, explicit meaning of scriptures, it is, like fundamentalism, lost “in the vale of idle fancy and waywardness.” He adds, that “the commentators of the Qur’án and they that follow the letter thereof misapprehended the inner meaning of the words of God and failed to grasp their essential purpose.”113 This would certainly include the new atheists.

Next time: a look at the philosophy of presentism.

======================== References =======================
106 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 280; 107 For example, An Existential Theology by John Macquarrie.; The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1, “Rudolf Bultmann,” p. 424. ;109 Jacob Needleman, Why Can’t We Be Good?, p. 10. ;110 Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace, p. 220. ;111 Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 123. ; 112 Bahá’u'lláh, The Kitab-i-Iqan, p. 105. ;113 Baha’u’llah, The Kitab-i-Iqan, p. 115.

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Ian Kluge

Perhaps the best portion of Daniel Dennett’s Breaking the Spell deals with Dennett’s concept of “belief in belief,”101 which he describes not as belief in God but belief that belief in God is a good thing, “something to be encouraged and fostered wherever possible.”102 He points out that “It is entirely possible to be an atheist and believe in belief in God.”103

He also suggests that some individuals who find their faith in God waning, try to restore that faith by enlisting others to believe in God. According to Dennett, while many believe in God, “Many more people believe in belief in God”104 which he regards as a kind of unconscious or unadmitted atheism.

People no longer believe in God but in a concept.

This raises an interesting question: ‘Is belief in the belief in God a kind of belief or unbelief?’ Can a person who believes that belief in God is a good really be considered an atheist, or is belief in the goodness of the concept of God itself a kind of faith in God? Has such an individual not taken the first intellectual step towards belief in God, i.e. is such a person not already on the road to faith insofar as he or she recognizes that a unique goodness lies in a certain kind of belief? If, moreover, we combine this belief or faith with action, as required by Abdu’l-Bahá, then belief in belief may, indeed, be a kind of faith.

The Bible also contains a relevant passage on this issue. The father of a child whom Christ was asked to heal said, “Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief.”105 Like Dennett’s believer in belief, he, too, suffered from unbelief—yet because he recognized the goodness of belief, Christ accepted his statement as a statement of belief and healed the child.

Unlike Dennett, therefore, we may interpret belief in belief as a species of belief in God, at least in principle.

================ References ===============
101 Daniel Dennett,  Breaking the Spell, p. 200. ; 102 Daniel Dennett,  Breaking the Spell, p. 221. ; 103 Daniel Dennett,  Breaking the Spell, p. 221.; 104 Daniel Dennett,  Breaking the Spell, p. 222. ; 105 Mark, 9: 24

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Ian Kluge

One of the areas of major disagreement between the Bahá’í Writings and the new atheism is the latter’s emphatic rejection—not just of the intolerance shown by religions—but also for inter-religious tolerance. Sam Harris writes,

…religious moderates are themselves the bearers of a terrible dogma: they imagine that the path to peace will be paved once each of us has learned to respect the unjustified beliefs of others. I hope to show that the very ideal of religious tolerance—born of the notion that every person can believe whatever he wants about God—is one of the principle forces driving us toward the abyss.96

It is worth pointing out that this atheist intolerance is a  peculiar self-contradiction, given the new atheism’s attack on religious intolerance.  It is a case of special pleading insofar as they apparently believe that atheist intolerance is somehow salutary. However, the new atheists go farther. Harris writes, “It is time we recognized that belief is not a private matter . . . beliefs are scarcely more private than actions are.”97

If beliefs are as public as actions, then they are subject to law and punishment like actions. Here we observe a more repressive side of the new atheism, which also becomes apparent when Dawkins writes

…children have a right not to have their minds addled by nonsense, and we as a society have a duty to protect them from it. So we should not allow more parents to teach their children to believe  . . . than we should allow parents to knock their children’s teeth out or lock them in a dungeon.98

As with Harris’s challenge to the concept of religion as a private personal matter, Dawkins’ claim suggests the instrument of law may have to be used to “protect them [children] from it [religion.” Hitchens ’ suggestion that teaching religion is “child-abuse”99 implies a similar line of action since child-abuse is not something any society should tolerate. He would at the very least forbid religious instruction until a child has attained “the age of reason.”100

Admittedly, Hitchens  says he would not ban religion even if he could, but  in light of his extreme rhetoric throughout his book, and especially in light of his claim that religious instruction is child abuse, this statement rings hollow. The intolerance of the new atheists—though it must be noted Dennett is largely free of this—also manifests itself in their expressions of contempt, insults, and other rhetorical hyperbole during their discussions. This might make their works more entertaining, but it does nothing to strengthen
the their arguments.

================ References =================
96 Sam Harris, The End of Faith, p. 15. ; 97 Sam Harris,  The End of Faith, p. 44. ; 98 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 367. ; 99 Christopher Hitchens , God Is Not Great, p. 217. ; 100 Christopher Hitchens , God Is Not Great, p. 220.